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Introduction 
 
Most of the contributions to this book focus on institutions of national economic 
governance whose regulatory purview is limited to activity that occurs within 
Australia.  However, one of the defining features of ‘globalization’1 is that political 
power and regulatory authority are no longer the exclusive preserve of governments 
acting within their territorial boundaries.  Globalization has been accompanied by the 
emergence of multi-layered governance—new forms of intergovernmental, 
supranational and even private sector regulatory mechanisms that complement, and in 
some cases, supersede national governance (Higgott et al 2000).  Governments have 
usually been willing partners in this process so it would be misleading to simply 
characterize these new forms of governance as being ‘external to’ or ‘imposed on’ 
national governments.  Moreover, in an era that is being shaped by processes of 
globalisation, individual states are increasingly reliant on an array of inter-
governmental and even non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to help them govern. 
Put simply, in the highly complex, internationally-integrated economic order in which 
national governments now operate, policymakers rely on international economic 
institutions to help co-ordinate such activities and provide a predictable, rule-
governed framework in which economic activity can take place.  These institutions 
for global economic governance create a regulatory environment that provides both 
opportunities and constraints for national governments with respect to domestic 
policy-making.  Given their crucial role in shaping the policies of national 
governments, these new forms of global governance offer us another prism through 
which we can explore some of the central questions of this volume.  
 
The first part of this chapter provides a broad theoretical discussion about the nature 
of global governance.  Here we briefly analyze the historical preconditions of the 
contemporary globalisation and the role of international economic institutions in 
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facilitating and managing international economic integration.  The discussion also 
emphasises the role of these institutions in developing, transmitting and consolidating 
certain policy ideas with a view to enhancing our understanding of the dynamics of 
change at both the international and national levels.  Our key argument here is that 
although the development of a more powerful superstructure of political institutions 
and economic co-ordination mechanisms across and above states may have been 
inevitable, the rationale that informed their policy direction was not.  Particular ideas 
about the most appropriate ways of organising economic activity have been promoted 
by political and economic interests that might expect to benefit from such initiatives. 
Such forces have played a crucial role within the key institutions of global economic 
governance and thus helped to shape the contemporary global political economy 
itself.  Perhaps the most striking aspect of the growth of international cooperation and 
the rise of global economic governance, however,  is that, with few exceptions, the 
institutions of governance are informed by a highly distinctive market-centred policy 
framework based on a broadly neo-liberal policy paradigm.  
 
The second part of this chapter examines how this process has affected Australia in a 
case study of its relationship with what is arguably the most powerful of the new 
international organisations that govern the global economy: the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).  One of the most important insights that emerges from this analysis is that 
globalization is a two-way street. In the complex dialectical interplay between the 
increasingly powerful economic forces and organizational structures that constitute 
the external international system on the one hand, and the contingent national 
institutional matrix through which such influences are mediated on the other, we find 
that while the forces of globalization may be constraining, they are not implacable. 
On the contrary, even a ‘middle power’ like Australia can exert a modest influence on 
the international regulatory system that exerts a growing influence on national policy 
choices.   
 
An exploration of Australia’s institutional relations with the GATT and the WTO 
helps us to understand the constraints and opportunities that confront states, and  
allows us to further unpack and debate some of the key themes of this book. We are 
particularly interested in how the rules, norms and principles of the multilateral trade 
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system have evolved, how they have affected and constrained Australia’s policy 
choices. However, we are also interested in how Australia has contributed to these 
rules and norms. While much of the globalization literature emphasizes the limitations 
that confront national policymakers in an internationally integrated and competitive 
public policy environment (see Cerny 1996), we shall provide an illuminating 
illustration of the way in which, despite these apparently overwhelming forces, 
individual states can still play a significant role in determining transnational 
regulatory outcomes. 
 
Globalization and Economic Governance 
To understand the increased prominence of international institutions of governance, 
and of the intensification of processes of globalisation, it is necessary to say 
something about the historical circumstances in which these inter-connected 
developments took place. The unique circumstances that obtained in the period 
following the Second World War and the subsequent evolution of the international 
system under the hegemonic leadership of the United States gave a distinctive liberal 
cast to the post-war order, one which ultimately locked-in specific and enduring 
patterns of international relations.  
 
The influence of US hegemony and the liberal ideal 
The international economic institutions which play such an important role in 
contemporary patterns of global governance were established in the wake of the Great 
Depression and World War Two. The challenge of post-war reconstruction presented 
a powerful incentive for collaboration among western democracies, which was made 
all the more urgent by the emergence of a powerful and, at that time, credible 
ideological rival in the shape of the Soviet Union. The task for the victorious capitalist 
powers, therefore, was to create a set of international institutions which not only 
helped avoid the sorts of crises that had characterised the inter-war period, but which 
would actually integrate the ‘free world’ into an inter-linked, ideologically 
sympathetic order that could oppose the spread of communism.  
 
The US-led post-war order was not simply capitalist, but its discourse was self-
consciously liberal and, as such, represented the ‘particular shaping of the political 
and social entities or spaces in which one lives through practices, principles, and 
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institutions associated with liberal governance, rights, markets, and self-
determination’ (Latham 1997: 14). US-inspired policy initiatives in the post-war 
period were intended to institutionalise normative judgements about the superiority of 
individualism and free markets. From its inception, in other words,  the international 
order that emerged following the war, which has driven the increased international 
integration of political and economic activity, was not simply a ‘technical’ solution to 
the problem of reconstruction and international economic management, but a 
profoundly political project that was as much ideational as it was an expression of 
American power in a more conventional sense.  
 
The Bretton Woods Conference (1944) provided the forum in which the US-led allied 
powers self-consciously sought to create a new system that would avoid the policy 
mistakes of the inter-war, Depression years.  The intention was to create a system of 
‘rules and understandings’ that would guide the behavior of individual nations, 
maintain an ‘open’ trading system, and preclude any possibility of resorting the sorts 
of ‘beggar thy neighbor’ protectionist policies that made the inter-war slump so 
difficult to resolve (Eichengreen and Kenen 1994:11). As part of the process of 
consolidating the emergent international economic system,  new institutions were 
established to help manage greater interdependency. The World Bank was established 
to finance development and post-war reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was intended to mange the conduct of international monetary policies, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  was intended to encourage 
nondiscriminatory, multilateral trade liberalization.2  
 
However, it is important to emphasize just how different this initial Bretton Woods 
order was form the system that operates today. At its inception, the post-war 
international system was characterized by what Ruggie (1982) famously called the 
‘compromise of embedded liberalism’, in which a balance was struck between the 
goal of maintaining an open international economic order and the wish to retain a 
capacity for domestic economic policy-making autonomy.  Indeed, for the first couple 
of decades following the Bretton Woods Agreement, there were noteworthy limits to 
the extent of the liberalization process. Significantly, the new economic order 
deliberately restricted the mobility of capital, which was seen as a potentially 
destructive force and central to the dynamics of the pre-war Depression. The financial 
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sector was largely discredited and blamed for many of the inter-war period’s 
economic problems, and lost much of its legitimacy and political influence as a 
consequence (Helleiner 1993: 22). Partly as a result of the financial sector’s 
diminished influence, governments were able to use social compensation mechanisms 
like the welfare state to  ameliorate the impact of structural change generated by 
integration into the wider world economy. Yet this original, highly regulated Bretton 
Woods regime that underpinned social welfare capitalism was ultimately undermined 
by a unilateral assertion of American power that overturned the established system of 
managed exchange rates, reduced national policy autonomy, and paved the way for 
the globalization of financial markets—an emblem of the contemporary ‘globalized’ 
era (Underhill 2000). 
 
Globalization and International Economic Institutions 
Globalisation is a notoriously contested and imprecise concept. For the purposes of 
this chapter when referring to globalisation we mean the intensification of flows of 
capital, goods and services, the spatial dispersion and disaggregation of production, 
and the transnationalization of political authority.  One of the most important 
characteristics of globalisation in the contemporary era, especially from the 
perspective of smaller, less powerful countries like Australia, is that the co-ordination 
of complex transnational activities, like a predictable and secure trading environment, 
for example, is highly dependent on international collaboration. Yet despite the 
greater interdependency globalisation induces, and caveats about the declining 
authority of states notwithstanding (Strange 1996), it is important to emphasise that 
the realisation and operation of collaborative agreements is ultimately dependent on 
the authority and actions of individual states.  
 
What is novel about the contemporary era, however,  is that such collaborative 
activities are not restricted to states: one of the most noteworthy aspects of any 
tendencies towards globalized processes of governance is the crucial role played by 
intergovernmental organisations such as the IMF and the WTO, by private sector 
organisations such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, and 
even by individuals with specific expertise (Picciotto 1996).  As Cerny (1995: 598) 
points out, there is a ‘new disjuncture between the institutional capacity [of individual 
states] to provide public goods and the structural characteristics of a much larger scale 
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global economy’. In such circumstances, states must collaborate with a range of new 
actors and authorities. 
 
Although the US remains the lynchpin of the contemporary international  financial 
and trading systems and able to influence their operation  in ways other states cannot, 
even the most powerful states find themselves part of, and reliant upon, a complex 
array of institutions and organisations that together constitute a system of governance.  
Like globalisation, the concept of ‘governance’ is imprecise, but for our purposes here 
may be taken to imply a process of governing that extends beyond the confines or 
purview of individual nation states and which encompasses other self-organising, 
networks of authority and control (Rhodes 1996: 660).  In practice, this means that 
national governments may no longer be the sole determinants of political and 
economic outcomes in specific issue areas and have little choice other than to co-
operate with other states and even non-state actors. International environmental 
management, for example,  is a classic example of an issue area that not only compels 
cooperation, but which demonstrates that actors from civil society may have some 
influence in shaping outcomes (Young 1999; Wapner 1995). 
 
As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) demonstrate in their mammoth study of global 
business regulation, it is very difficult to make generalizations about the origins, 
ideologies and impact of the hundreds of international protocols, conventions, 
agreements and organizations that regulate economic activity within and across the 
territorial boundaries of nation states. It is nevertheless useful to make some broad 
statements about the emergence of international economic institutions, their role in the 
international political economy and their interaction with national authorities.   
 
In historical terms, the rise of international institutions is intimately associated with 
and in part a response to ‘the industrial age and the liberal internationalist ideology 
that accompanied its evolution in the West’ (Weber 2000: 105).   In part then, these 
institutions of global governance are a response to the perceived need to reduce 
transaction costs in an increasingly complex and competitive operating environment; 
an idea that has been a central part of economic institutionalist theory (North and 
Thomas 1973;  North 1996).  This is not to suggest, however, that markets are a 
‘natural’ phenomenon, or that they can exist outside of supportive frameworks of 
  
 
6
political authority (see Polanyi 1957).  On the contrary, the evolution of the 
international political economy from a Keynesian-inspired regime of managed 
economies to the contemporary market-driven neoliberal order reminds us that 
economic systems reflect particular political choices and are governed by specific 
organisations.  Moreover, these institutions of global economic governance play a 
crucial role in developing, transmitting of particular policy ideas - and consolidating 
the influence of the political and economic interests that support them - which 
ultimately come to exert a profound influence on governments and effectively delimit 
the sorts of policies that are deemed feasible. 
 
A key point to recognise about these institutions is that they are not simply inevitable 
responses to the exigencies of managing complex activities like international financial 
markets. While much of their legitimacy and authority may be derived from their 
perceived competence and expertise in specific issue areas (Fischer 1990), 
international economic institutions also provide an important forum for the expression 
of political interests. That being said, institutions are not just member-driven forums 
for the expression and negotiation of difference among nation states; many 
international institutions have the capacity and often the desire to influence the course 
and content of national policies along particular lines.  In other words, even though 
intergovernmental organisations are necessarily the creations of governments, once 
established, many of them can assume something of a life of their own.  This is 
especially true of the institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which all have 
large and well-resourced secretariats.3  It is less true however of the WTO; as the 
events of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of December 1999 showed, despite the 
enthusiasm within the WTO Secretariat for a new ‘millennium round’ of trade 
negotiations, in the absence of consensus among the member states, the ‘organisation’ 
can do nothing.  Generally speaking however, the prestige and authority that attaches 
to international institutions as supposedly independent and apolitical repositories of 
specific expertise may give international organisations the potential to influence state 
behaviour, especially where states find themselves vulnerable as a result of economic 
difficulties. As Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 713) observe: ‘Armed with a notion of 
progress, an idea of how to create the better life, and some understanding of the 
conversion process, many international organization elites have as their stated purpose 
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a desire to shape state practices by establishing, articulating and transmitting norms 
that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behavior.’ 
 
Theorising policy change:  regimes, policy entrepreneurs and epistemic communities 
To understand how this complex dialectic between national and global forces 
operates, and why it is that only certain sorts of ideas and initiatives are likely to be 
championed by such organisations, we need to situate the relationship between 
national governments and international institutions into a wider theoretical 
framework.  There are a number of ways of conceptualising the relationship between 
individual nation-states and that complex array of international organisations, 
financial structures and corporations that is the ‘external’ system,  or between 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ politics more generally. Robert Putnam (1988: 434) 
famously suggested that the domestic-international relationship could be thought of as 
a ‘two-level game’ in which politicians attempt to construct coalitions amongst 
domestic pressure groups and then satisfy their demands by minimising the impact of 
adverse external developments.4 Although this model was a significant improvement 
on those that neglected divergent domestic sources of policy, in the increasingly 
interlinked contemporary system where the status of discrete national economies is 
questionable (Bryan 1995), and where political activity routinely spills over national 
borders or is penetrated by external forces, even this formulation seems inadequate.  
Not only are the boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ pragmatically porous, 
theoretically contentious and changeable across time (Buzan and Little 2000), but the 
overarching institutional framework and politic-economic context within which 
international activity occurs, and which helps to determine which issues are addressed 
by organisations and national governments in the first place, is seriously neglected. 
 
One way of overcoming this deficit is by introducing another contested concept: 
regimes. Particular issue areas, like the maintenance of an open trading system, or 
global environmental problems, require collaborative transnational efforts if they are 
to be managed effectively. The great advantage of regime theory is that it offers a way 
considering the complex and shifting web of political authorities and practices that 
constitute an international system of governance, or elements thereof, at any moment 
in history. The great disadvantage is that much regime theory is shot through with 
unacknowledged or unrecognised normative biases. A good deal of regime theory has 
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sought to uncritically explain or justify United States hegemony and the presumed 
benefits that flow from it (Hasenclever et al 1997).  Nevertheless, regime theory does 
offer one way of both linking together various levels of analysis, and of grasping the 
way such disparate forces reflect and institutionalise the powerful ideas that 
distinguish a particular era (Beeson forthcoming). Indeed, the standard definition of 
regimes makes this link clear: regimes are ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1983: 2). The big 
question, of course, is why some norms and principles and not others come to be 
dominant components of specific regimes at any given moment. 
 
In the space available to us here, we can only sketch an answer to this question, but a 
couple of points are worth highlighting. First, at the most general historical level, 
long-term structural changes in the global economy and the concomitant change in the 
influence of various non-state actors may fundamentally change the norms, principles 
and understandings upon which specific regimes are based. One of the clearest 
examples of this is the displacement of the Keynesian principles that had been the 
guiding rationale of the emergent post-war order by monetarist ideas following the 
apparent exhaustion of the Keynesian system in the inflation-plagued 1970s (see Glyn 
et al 1990). In the case of Britain, which played a prominent role in propelling this 
paradigm shift, the crucial factor that facilitated this move was a political rather than 
simply a technocratic debate about the relative merits of policy (Hall 1993). Indeed, 
one of the distinguishing features of both the British experience, and the conversion to 
neoliberalism of the Anglo-American economies more generally, has been the ability 
of business interests and what Paul Krugman (1994) calls ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to 
influence governments and to change the basis and direction of policy (see Cockett 
1994; Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). Structural and geo-political changes within the 
international political-economy  presented  opportunities for specific interests - 
especially those associated with mobile financial assets - to push for the winding back 
of domestic constraints and the further liberalization  of financial markets (Bell 1997: 
101-06). 
 
The second point to emphasize then is that the content of both national policy 
paradigms and the values and ideas that are promoted by influential international 
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organizations owes a good deal to the contingent circumstances and what 
policymakers have imbibed from domestic and international influences.  In other 
words, the patterns of governance that are deemed most appropriate at any given time 
are to some extent learned. Because of the specialist nature of the knowledge provided 
by particular organizations, ‘networks of experts as learners and transmitters of 
knowledge’ have become influential parts of the policy making process (Hass and 
Hass 1995: 257). One of the most striking examples of the influence of private sector 
actors may be seen in the role played by the financial markets and the international 
rating agencies in sanctioning ‘appropriate’ public policy (Sinclair 1994). More 
subtly, the prominent role played by private sector experts in developing a regulatory 
regime for international securities markets (Underhill 1995) demonstrates the way that 
states have become increasingly influenced by, and reliant upon, non-state or private 
sector actors.   
 
The consolidation of neo-liberalism 
Let us try to draw together the threads of this highly truncated theoretical discussion 
and isolate the key points that will help us to understand the relationship between 
countries like Australia and institutions of global economic governance. The first 
point to emphasise is that even though we now inhabit an international system in 
which political authority and processes of governance are not simply the preserve of 
individual states but to some extent shared with a diverse array of non-state actors, the 
contemporary global political economy continues to be powerfully shaped by the 
liberal order established after the Second World War. What has changed however, 
especially in the period following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, has 
been the precise role played by key institutions like the IMF (Pauly 1997) and—as we 
shall see—the WTO.  The principle of embedded liberalism has been undermined, 
and the policy autonomy of states with respect to domestic economic governance has 
been increasingly constrained.  Institutions of global economic governance have 
become central to the neoliberal order and are associated with contemporary 
processes of globalisation and the dominance of international business interests. This 
had led Panitch (2000: 11) the state has been transformed from a welfare system into 
a regime ‘designed to facilitate and police the free flow of capital around the globe’.  
While Panitch’s statement is somewhat hyperbolic, especially in the context of the 
OECD’s dramatic failure to negotiate the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
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(MAI), the general thrust of his observation has merit, especially as far as the 
influence of the financial sector is concerned. 
 
This leads to a second point: even though we now live in a post-Cold War 
environment in which strategic considerations have become increasingly subordinate 
to economic issues on the agendas of policymakers, especially in the industrialised 
world (Buzan and Little 1999), this has not diminished the hegemonic influence of the 
United States in the global political economy (Panitch 2000).  Indeed, the East Asian 
crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated that once freed from the necessity of underwriting the 
strategic integrity of western capitalism, the United States has been prepared to use its 
own position, and the powerful international organisations over which it exerts such a 
preponderant influence, to reconfigure the domestic institutions of other nations 
(Beeson 1999, Noble and Ravenhill 2000). 
 
A third and crucial point flows from this: although policy entrepreneurs, experts and 
epistemic communities may be influential and may—especially at times of crisis—be 
able to shift policy from one paradigm to another, such influences are highly 
constrained by the overarching character of the wider system of which they are a part. 
On the one hand this refers to the fact that the global political economy is dominated 
by American power, giving a distinct cast to the nature of contemporary hegemony 
(Ruggie 1993).  Thus organisational change and learning can only occur where ‘the 
efforts of epistemic communities [are] accepted and advocated by a coalition of 
hegemonic member states rather than being endorsed merely by majorities of weak 
states’ (Haas and Haas 1995: 261).  In other words, policy initiatives and ideas are 
more dependent on the effective political support of powerful economic interests than 
they are on compelling logic.  Discourse is a necessary but not sufficient engine of 
change.  
 
This leads to a final, obvious, but often overlooked point. If prospective policy 
initiatives are to become a meaningful part of the activities of states and international 
organisations, they must be congruent with market-centred, business-dominated, 
capitalist practices and social values.  At a time when there is no obvious alternative 
to capitalism apart than other varieties of capitalism, it is easy to overlook how 
profoundly its systemic qualities circumscribe the range of ‘realistic’ options available 
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to policymakers. While Giddens (1984), Wendt (1999) and Finnemore (1996) are 
right to highlight the way in which the values and  interests of actors in the 
international system are socially constructed in complex interactions, they neglect the 
essentially constrained nature of this process. Great expectations are held about the 
progressive and transformative role of non-government organizations and global civil 
society (O’Brien et al 2000), but it is important to note that NGOs may be 
incorporated into and even substitute for state-centric patterns of governance (Morris-
Suzuki 2000).  Indeed, for all the attention given to apparent rise of international civil 
society and the prominence of NGOs, it is important to recognise that they are integral 
parts of and actively help to constitute and regulate a global capitalist order (Hardt 
and Negri 2000).  
 
This first section has sketched the way in which an overarching global capitalist 
economy centred on markets and liberal values has emerged in the post-war period, 
indicated  how it has evolved, and suggested how such developments constrain 
national policymakers. In some ways, this has become the dominant explanation of 
the post-war environment within which states like Australia must operate. And yet as 
the second part of our discussion will show, even small countries like Australia can 
exert some influence on some of the most powerful organisations of the contemporary 
world order. Examining the way Australian policymakers and policy entrepreneurs 
have gone about this tells us much about the way the international system works and 
the extent of the possibilities for policy activism that remain open within it. 
 
 
Australia and the GATT/WTO 
 
From GATT to WTO: From non-discrimination to free trade 
The origins of the multilateral trade system can be traced to the disastrous economic 
policies of the inter-war period.  Problems of currency convertibility in the 1920s 
were exacerbated by the adoption of highly protectionist and discriminatory trade 
policies in the 1930s and the international economy fragmented into competing 
economic blocs, each dominated by a major power. These economic policies were 
seen by many to have been a major cause of the Second World War, and there was 
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broad albeit qualified agreement among the western allies on the importance of 
promoting non-discrimination and trade liberalization after the war.  
 
In December 1945, the United States presented its vision for the establishment of an 
agreement on multilateral, which alongside the IMF and the World Bank, would be 
the third pillar of the Bretton Woods system.  The United States proposals invoked the 
provisions of the wartime Mutual Aid agreements which had committed the western 
Allies to promote trade liberalization and non-discrimination in international trade.  
The end result of these proposals was the GATT, established in late 1947 after two 
years of intensive negotiations among a number of countries (Brown 1950; Gardner 
1980; Wilcox 1949).  Although the establishment of the multilateral trade system is 
often misrepresented as a singular American achievement, the reality is that it was an 
achievement shared among nations, the result of hard-fought compromises between 
competing visions for the postwar trading system. As a trading nation and original 
contracting party to the GATT, Australia was one of the countries that played a major 
part in determining the rules and norms of the multilateral trade system (Capling 
2000). 
 
The GATT was a multilateral treaty that established a set of rules that applied to 
government measures that restrain, distort or regulate international trade in 
manufactured goods.  It is crucial to note that despite the assertions of many 
contemporary commentators, the GATT was not meant by its founders to be a charter 
for free trade.  Rather, the keystone of the GATT was non-discrimination: its aim was 
to prevent a retreat into the economic blocs that had characterized the international 
political economy during the 1930s, and to bring an end to bilateralism and other 
discriminatory trade arrangements, including the imperial preferential agreements 
between Britain and the Dominions.  Non-discrimination was enshrined in most-
favored-nation (MFN) rule that requires GATT signatories to apply tariffs and other 
trade barriers equally to imports from all other signatories, without offering 
preferences or favors. 
 
This is not to say that the norm of trade liberalization was absent from the GATT.  
Indeed, the GATT included rules pertaining to the use of protective and trade-
distorting measures such as tariffs export subsidies and quantitative import 
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restrictions.  And, the Geneva conference that established the GATT in 1947 was 
accompanied by multilateral trade negotiations where representatives from 23 nations 
including Australia negotiated tariff reductions on thousands of traded goods.  But the 
GATT did not force trade liberalization on any country. The freedom to use tariffs 
was not constrained; for instance, in Australia quantitative import restrictions and the 
protective tariff continued to be the most important instrument of its manufacturing 
industry development.  Moreover, safeguards were built into the GATT to enable 
countries to be released from their obligations in a wide variety of circumstances 
(Finlayson and Zacher 1981). These norms—non-discrimination, safeguards, industry 
and economic development—took precedence over trade liberalization, especially in 
an era when there was no consensus on the virtues of free trade. As Jacob Viner 
(quoted in Ruggie 1982: 398) observed at the time: ‘There are few free traders in the 
present-day world, no one pays any attention to their views, and no person in 
authority anywhere advocates free trade.’ 
 
While these norms continue to influence the rules of the WTO, the dominant 
discourse is no longer informed by embedded liberalism but by neo-liberalism and the 
language of free trade. Space limitations prevent us from entering into the debate 
about the shortcomings of economic theories that underpin the argument for free 
trade, so we will only make two observations here about the impact of the neo-liberal 
ascendancy in the WTO.  First, free trade discourse has contributed to the erosion of 
the norm of multilateralism by providing a justification for the proliferation of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. While some trade economists argue that such 
arrangements are ‘stepping stones’ to global free trade, the reality is that they are 
inherently discriminatory and trade-distorting, and deeply undermine the original 
purpose of the GATT.  Our second point is simply to note the cognitive dissonance 
associated with the WTO’s free trade rhetoric and the practices of the most powerful 
members of the organization.  Rather than spurring some of the most recalcitrant 
governments to adopt trade liberalization in areas such as textiles and agriculture, the 
gulf between rhetoric and practice serves to undermine the integrity of the WTO and 
its ability to deliver benefits from trade liberalization in any meaningful or equitable 
way in the global political economy.   
 
  
 
14
The GATT was only ever an intergovernmental treaty, and the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995 provided an organizational and juridical basis for the multilateral trade 
system.  The decision to replace the GATT with what has quickly become the world’s 
most important international economic institution reflected two needs.  First, the 
massive expansion of trade rules into areas such services, intellectual property, 
agriculture, and investment measures, as a result of the Uruguay Round (1986-94) 
required a new international institutional framework to house these agreements.  
Second, growing concerns about American ‘aggressive unilateralism’ (Bhagwati and 
Patrick 1990) led other governments to seek the development of a strong dispute 
settlement mechanism that would help to curb unilateral actions by the economic 
superpowers (Ostry 1997).    
 
It is still too soon to determine whether the WTO will be as effective as the GATT 
once was in enabling national political communities to express their differences, 
resolve their conflicts, and manage their common affairs on an international basis 
(Wolfe 1999).  For instance, there are many concerns about the new dispute 
settlement mechanisms about the excessive secrecy in these deliberations and the lack 
of opportunities for participation by NGOs (Wallach and Sforza 1999).  Others are 
concerned that the WTO has become excessively legalistic and brittle, and no longer 
has the flexibility and pragmatism that was central to the GATT (Gordon 1996).   
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the multilateral trade system underpinned by the 
GATT and the WTO, provides many benefits for small countries, hence Australia’s 
strong support for the ‘rules-based’ system of trade.  A major benefit of these 
multilateral institutions has been the way that they have helped to constrain the 
behavior of more powerful states.  Indeed, to the extent that multilateral rules for trade 
exist at all, the weak benefit.  Acknowledging that the global trade agenda has been 
dominated by the interests of American corporations, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 
x) still conclude that the existence of multilateral rules for trade means that ‘virtually 
every nation outside sub-Saharan Africa [is] better off than it otherwise would be.’   
 
Hegemony and small power influence:  the role of policy entrepreneurs 
The WTO, like the GATT before it, has been dominated by the economic 
superpowers, the United States and the European Union. This is especially true with 
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respect to periodic rounds of multilateral trade negotiations which have been 
dominated by bargains struck between United States and Europe which are 
subsequently extended to (or imposed upon) others in the system. Most supporters of 
the multilateral trade system see this hegemony as a necessary if unfortunate aspect of 
ensuring the sustainability of the system, for without it, the Americans and Europeans 
would defect and the system would fall apart.  Nevertheless, the capacity of the 
United States to set the agenda, and of the Europe to block it, has long been a source 
of frustration for many of the ‘non-great’ powers in the multilateral trade system.   
 
Australia in particular struggled with this for many years and Canberra’s diplomatic 
efforts to overcome the problems associated with great power domination—especially 
as it pertained to agricultural protectionism—had very limited success during the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s (Cooper 1998). During the Uruguay Round, however, 
Australia abandoned its tradition of ‘going it alone’ in the GATT and sought instead 
to promote cooperation among like-minded nations to achieve specific goals, typically 
in the face of opposition from one or other of the great powers.  These cooperative 
efforts helped to prise open the negotiating process to other small powers and enabled 
them to exert considerable influence over agenda-setting and negotiating processes.  
 
Before examining Australia’s coalitional and cooperative diplomacy during the 
Uruguay Round, it is important to provide some background.  Canberra’s Uruguay 
Round diplomacy was an integral facet of the Labor government’s embrace of 
neoliberalism during the 1980s.  Beginning with financial deregulation, the removal 
of exchange controls on capital movements, and the float of the Australian dollar, 
Labor’s economic reform program was designed to expose the economy to 
international competition as a means to force rapid structural change. Dramatic 
unilateral tariff reductions announced in 1988 and 1991 were aimed at winding back 
uncompetitive industries, and a variety of government incentive and assistance 
schemes were developed to promote economic diversification towards more valued-
added production and the encouragement of services and manufactured good exports 
(Bell 1992, Capling and Galligan 1992).   
 
The external dimension of this process focused on export diversification and 
expansion, increased economic engagement with the East Asian region, as 
  
 
16
exemplified in Prime Minister Hawke’s 1989 APEC initiative, and on a strong 
commitment to liberalization and multilateralism in the global economy.  Australia’s 
efforts during the Uruguay Round were focused on two negotiating areas in particular: 
agriculture and services.  In both of these negotiations, policy entrepreneurship was 
central to Australia’s capacity to influence both agendas and outcomes.  To be sure, in 
the absence of willingness on the part of the major powers to negotiate substantial 
agreements in these areas, Australia’s small power diplomacy would have enjoyed far 
less success.  But in the complex Uruguay Round negotiations, where the major 
players had key objectives and were willing to make sacrifices in some areas of 
negotiation to achieve desired outcomes in others, Australian diplomacy was able to 
bring together groups of like-minded nations that worked together in both formal and 
informal processes to establish new multilateral rules and disciplines in highly 
contentious areas of international trade.   
 
In the agriculture negotiations, Australia’s policy entrepreneurship occurred in two 
key areas of activity.  First, during the mid-1980s, while the agenda for the Uruguay 
Round was still being developed, a handful of senior Australian trade officials, 
working closely with their counterparts in Argentina and the United States, and the 
Chair of the GATT Committee for Trade in Agriculture, Arthur De Zeeuw, began to 
give shape for a plan for what might be achieved in the agriculture negotiation, at a 
time when few believed that changes was possible.  This work in Geneva drew on 
OECD research, also the result of Australian expert initiatives which had drawn their 
foundations from earlier work undertaken by the Australian Tariff Board and the 
Industries Assistance Commission (Capling 2001).  
 
Australia’s work in helping to develop a negotiating approach for agriculture was 
complemented by the Labor government’s initiative in pulling together a group of 
like-minded countries to press for liberalization in global agricultural trade.  Here 
Australia’s efforts were driven by an increasing concern over the effects of trading 
practices in agriculture by the United States and the European Community.  These 
countries maintained a wide variety of restrictions on agricultural imports and 
subsidized exports of their agricultural surpluses, often undercutting more efficient 
producers in other countries including Australia. Australian governments had 
persistently expressed concerns about agricultural protectionism and had tried many 
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times to extend GATT disciplines to trade in agriculture, only to be stymied due to 
lack of support for these efforts on the part of the United States and western Europe. 
But by the early 1980s, the distortions in international agricultural trade were having 
profoundly negative consequences for Australian agricultural exports.  
 
The Cairns Group, established in 1986, consisted of fourteen governments with an 
expressed interest in restoring some fairness and order in agricultural trade: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay (Cooper et al 1993, 
Tussie 1993).  This was a heterogeneous grouping drawn from a full range on the 
economic spectrum and all points of the global political compass. Collectively the 
Cairns Group countries accounted for 25 per cent of world trade in agriculture 
(greater than the United States share and slightly less than the European Community) 
and had major export interests in specific commodities (Oxley 1992: 113-4).  Such a 
broad-based coalition was meant to act as a ‘third force’ in the Uruguay Round, 
prodding the Americans and the Europeans into action, while guarding against a 
bilateral deal between them that did not address Cairns Group concerns.  
 
The Cairns Group was the most unusual, cohesive and effective coalition of countries 
ever seen in multilateral trade negotiations.  Throughout the Uruguay Round it acted 
as a ‘conscience’ for the agriculture negotiations and fought to prevent the United 
States from giving in to the Europeans as it had done in the Tokyo and Kennedy 
Rounds, putting off agriculture trade reform in exchange for concessions on industrial 
products.  In the end, the Cairns Group was not able to prevent the agriculture 
negotiations from reverting to the traditional bilateral deal-making between the 
majors—a deal that fell well short of Cairns Group expectations and objectives.  But 
it had been able to exercise enormous influence over the negotiating process. Without 
the Cairns Group, the United States and Europe would have been content to paper 
over their differences. Without the Cairns Group, there would have been no 
comprehensive framework agreement with disciplines in the three areas of domestic 
support, market access and export subsidies.  Without the Cairns Group, there would 
have been no barriers to the cozy market-sharing deals traditionally favored by the 
major economic powers. 
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Another area of the Uruguay Round where Australia ‘punched above its weight’ was 
in the negotiations on services which led to the new General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).  Australia’s contribution to the services negotiations far outweighed 
its importance in world services trade.  Like the agriculture negotiations, Australia’s 
capacity to influence the GATS negotiations stemmed in part from the role of its 
policy entrepreneurs.  Drake and Nicolaïdes (1992) argue that an international 
epistemic community was instrumental in convincing governments of the merits of 
developing a multilateral framework regulating trade in services.  Prominent 
Australian trade economists, Richard Snape and Gary Sampson, were key members of 
this epistemic community who made substantial contributions to this debate in 
Australia and abroad.  Both went on to positions of influence during the GATS 
negotiation: Sampson to the GATT Secretariat as Director of Services, and Snape as a 
trade policy advisor to the Labor government.  
 
Australian negotiators also played a central role in developing the rules and norms for 
the new GATS framework agreement.  Unlike Australia’s Cairns Group diplomacy, 
formal coalition-building was not an option, largely because services was a new area 
for negotiation and was therefore not a negotiation of confrontation.  Instead Australia 
adopted another strategy open to small states, that of facilitator and ‘ginger group’ 
activist.  As facilitator, Australia contributed technical and intellectual expertise in 
what proved to be highly complex negotiations (Capling 2001).  The ability of 
Australian officials to influence these debates, and the contours of the final 
agreement, rested on their conceptual command of complex technical, legal, 
economic and political issues involved in trade in services.  As Drake and Nicolaïdes 
(1992: 91) note: ‘This mastery rather than brute national power accounted for the 
unexpectedly central roles played by delegates from countries such as Australia, 
Egypt, India and Sweden.’ Australia’s influence also derived from its leadership of 
the Rolle Group, a ginger group that worked to keep momentum in the negotiating 
process and to keep the services agreement as broad and fair as possible. Australia’s 
‘aggressive multilateralism’ in the services negotiations was a good example of the 
diplomacy of enlightened self-interest, an approach which served Australia’s needs as 
well as those of many other small countries with limited economic and political clout.   
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Based on Australia’s experiences of promoting coalitional and cooperative diplomacy 
during the Uruguay Round, we could draw out a few key observations.  First, and 
most obviously, policy entrepreneurship makes it possible for small countries to 
influence the process and outcomes of multilateral trade negotiations, even in a 
system that is dominated by the economic superpowers.  But here a caveat must be 
added.  It is important to recognize that Australia’s objectives in these negotiations 
were not limited to market-opening or purely defensive exercises: they were focused 
on the improvement or creation of institutions that provide a framework for the 
operation of global markets.  For example, in the GATS negotiations, Australia’s 
chief objective was not trade liberalization but rather the development of an effective 
multilateral framework with strong general obligations for non-discrimination.  
Similarly, in agriculture, Australia’s major concern was to bring agriculture back into 
the GATT, and to create more transparency and accountability in national agricultural 
support regimes.  In other words, Australia’s efforts were focused on enhancing and 
shoring up the institutions that promote fairness in the multilateral trade system, and 
this is an important part of understanding why it achieved reasonable success in these 
areas. 
 
Conclusion  
The conventional wisdom about the status of states at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century – especially middle powers like Australia – is that they are increasingly less 
able to influence the shape and operation of the international system of which they are 
a part. While there is clearly a good deal of merit in this argument, we need to 
remember that ‘the international system’ is simply a convenient shorthand for that 
complex array of actors, activities and agreements which constitute the global 
political-economy. In this multi-dimensional, multi-actor world,  states remain the 
institutional bedrock and ultimate source of authority upon which more complex 
modes of government can be constructed. Certainly, the state may not be as powerful 
or autonomous as it once was, nor can it achieve its ends without relying on other 
states and the host of non-state actors and  intergovernmental organizations that are 
part of contemporary governance. Yet states, even ones with modest capacities and 
powers like Australia, can and do influence the international system of which they are 
a part. The international system is constraining, but not disempowering.  
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A key observation that emerges from our discussion is that despite the domination of 
the GATT and WTO by the economic superpowers, ‘non-great powers’ like Australia 
have played a role in shaping its policies.  Although some states clearly have more 
capacity to influence the agendas of such organisations than others, the important 
point to emphasise here is that the emergence of these organisations, and thus their 
norms, principles and rules, is still dependent on the actions of national governments.  
The institutions of global economic governance that exercise an increasingly powerful 
influence over nation-states are a product of specific circumstances, the political 
choices of state actors, and the policy ideas that inform such initiatives. What is 
crucial about these collaborative regimes in the long term, however, is their capacity 
to make binding commitments that effectively lock in specific policy paradigms and 
marginalise others. 
 
Not only do states have the capacity to influence the content and operation 
international regimes, but they play a crucial mediating role which determines the 
influence such agreements have at the domestic level. What is interesting and striking 
about the Australian experience is the way in which national policymakers actually 
attempted to shape international norms that would ultimately influence and encourage 
specific domestic values and outcomes. In other words, while there may now be 
powerful constraints on domestic policy, the state is not simply reduced to a 
‘transmission belt’ that impotently transmits powerful externally generated 
imperatives (Cox 1992 ). On the contrary, as our discussion demonstrates, the 
interplay between the domestic and external spheres is a good deal more complex and 
reciprocal than some analyses would have us believe. What is more questionable and 
uncertain is whether policy initiatives that radically deviate from the neoliberal 
orthodoxy that has emerged over the last few decades are possible in an international 
system that continues to be shaped by the combined force of American hegemony and 
the demands of an international capitalist system dominated by the interests of 
financial capital. If the international economy continues to evince major insatiability 
that ultimately affects the US itself, we may get a chance to find out. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Globalization is a notoriously contested an imprecise concept about which there is 
now a voluminous literature. For the purposes of this essay it will be understood to 
refer to the way in which increasingly interconnected economic, political and social 
processes transcend national borders and create new forms of transcontinental 
governance and organization.  
2 Although the Bretton Woods Conference may have had the clear goal of restoring 
stability and prosperity to the international system, the specifics of the Agreement 
reflected an important ideational struggle. British and American economists led by 
John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White were able to exploit a uniquely fluid 
historical moment to influence the policy agendas of their respective national 
governments entrenching the Keynesian notion that governments could play a 
potentially crucial and effective role in regulating economic activity (Ikenberry 1992). 
3 We would not wish to overstate this institutional autonomy, as organization like the 
IMF are clearly closely aligned with and responsive the foreign policy agenda of the 
US (see Beeson 1999; Rapkin 1997). However, within the overarching context of a 
market centered, global capitalist system, such organizations can exert a degree of 
independent influence. 
4 It should be noted that in this regard Australia is somewhat atypical to the general 
international pattern, in that the state has actually used external pressures to increase 
domestic competitive pressures in the belief that this will enhance ‘Australia’s’ 
overall economic performance. See Beeson and Firth 1998). 
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